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Abstract 
Most philosophers writing on the ethics of war endorse “reductivist individualism,” a view that 
holds both that killing in war is subject to the very same principles of ordinary morality 
(reductivism); and that morality concerns individuals and their rights, and does not treat 
collectives as having any special status (individualism). I argue that this commitment to 
individualism poses problems for this view in the case of national defense. More specifically, I 
argue that the main strategies for defending individualist approaches to national defense either 
fail by their own lights or yield deeply counterintuitive implications. I then offer the foundations 
for a collectivist approach. I argue that such an approach must do justice to the collective goods 
that properly constituted states make possible and protect through certain acts of defensive war; 




Most philosophers writing on the ethics of war nowadays are reductive-individualists. The first 
part of this approach, reductivism, holds that killing in war is subject to the very same principles 
that apply elsewhere in morality (Fabre 2012; Frowe 2014; McMahan 2009a; Rodin 2002). 
Typically this is taken to mean that justified killing in war is essentially a series of justified acts 
of individual self- or other defense. More generally, the core idea is that war is not a sui generis 
moral domain. The second part of this approach, individualism, rejects the idea that states or 
collectives have any special moral status as such, and holds that individuals are the primary locus 
of moral worth. When taken together, as they generally are, this pair of commitments generates a 
view according to which war is seen as an agglomeration of individual acts performed by 
individual actors, subject only to the constraints of interpersonal morality. 
This view is in many respects appealing, but it yields certain deeply counter-intuitive 
conclusions. In particular, its defenders have trouble accommodating what I take to be one of our 
core intuitions concerning when war is justified—namely, certain cases of national defense. 
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problem illustrates the need for an alternative approach to the morality of war—in particular, one 
that makes room for the special status of collectives. While there are a few collectivist proposals 
on offer, these generally involve rejecting reductivism altogether by relying on the idea that the 
moral criteria applicable in war are effectively sui generis (Kutz 2005; Walzer 1977; Zohar 
1993). That is, these views tend toward a view that denies both parts of reductive-individualism, 
a view we might call non-reductivist-collectivism. In this essay, I offer the framework for a 
middle-ground alternative. That is, I will sketch a collectivist view of national defense that relies 
on certain moral principles we already have independent reason to accept. This view is 
compatible with a broad form of reductivism: it is still true, on my view, that the principles that 
apply elsewhere in morality apply here too—though perhaps there are rarely other instances in 
interpersonal morality in which they would be applicable.1 But the view is also collectivist: 
certain collectives may themselves have a certain special status that is not entirely reducible to 
the individuals that comprise it.2 Many states or nations, I argue, have such status.  
I begin the discussion by considering two influential reductivist-individualist accounts—
namely, David Rodin’s account, which rejects national defense as a just cause, and Cecile 
                                               
1 Seth Lazar has argued that a view such as the one I articulate in this essay—namely, one that employs 
collective or impersonal goods (i.e., those goods that cannot be wholly reducible to specific 
individuals)—would be, for that reason, non-reductivist. This is because, according to such a view, “The 
goods that it is worth killing for in ordinary life simply are not sufficient to explain the permissibility of 
killing in war” (Lazar 2014, p. 33). So, even though the moral principles are the same as those of 
interpersonal morality, the context of war creates a shift in their application. I think the answer to this 
terminological question is far from obvious, in part because it is not always clear what distinguishes 
reductivism from an alternative like the one Lazar envisions. For this reason, I will continue to call the 
view I propose here ‘reductivist’, even if, in the end, it turns out not to be. This terminological issue is not 
ultimately central to the arguments in what follows.  
2 Some reductive-individualists have recognized the need for a view like this, though the terms they apply 
to it, or the way they frame the view, are somewhat different. See, for example, Jeff McMahan: “[E]ven 
the most reductive form of individualism must take account of distinctively collective goods, such as 
collective self-identification or collective self-determination, and thus recognize that there may be wrongs 
that are not entirely reducible to wrongs against individuals because they have a collective as their 
subject” (McMahan 2005, p. 12).  
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Fabre’s account, which attempts to accommodate it. In my view, the former conclusion is too 
revisionist, and the latter fails to secure a sufficiently robust version of national defense. I then 
explain the two central desiderata for a collectivist alternative—i.e., that it can explain both the 
value of collective goods and the degree of national partiality required to render certain acts of 
national defense justified. I then offer a defense of these points that is compatible with a broadly 
reductivist approach. 
2. Two Reductivist-Individualist Accounts of National Defense 
2.1: Rodin’s Reductivist-Individualist Account 
In War and Self-Defense, David Rodin defends a reductivist-individualist account of the ethics of 
war based on the claim that lethal force is only proportionate in defense of one’s central rights, a 
category that includes the rights not be killed, maimed, or enslaved (Rodin 2002, pp. 127–132). 
Lethal force is not, therefore, proportionate in defense of one’s lesser rights, a category within 
which Rodin includes such things as an individual’s right to his country’s territorial integrity, 
political independence, and other purely political rights. In other words, purely political rights 
are not, in and of themselves, sufficiently important to render the use of lethal force in their 
defense justified.  
Rodin illustrates this idea with an example known as the argument from bloodless 
invasion (Rodin 2002, pp. 131–132). Imagine that a foreign military plans to invade our country 
to annex some of our territory. Suppose they pose no direct threat to the lives of our civilians; 
they will only use violent force against those who manifestly resist their invasion.3 Since none of 
our citizens’ central rights are directly threatened by this invasion, the use of lethal force is 
therefore impermissible. Of course, a successful annexation will entail the violation of some of 
                                               
3 Perhaps the 1982 Falklands War is, at least in many important respects, a real world case that most 
closely mirrors this hypothetical example. 
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our purely political rights. But even though lethal force may be necessary to prevent this rights 
violation, it would not, on Rodin’s view, be proportionate, for the violated right is simply not 
important or central enough to justify killing in defense of it. 
Rather than concluding that this so-called reductive strategy must be jettisoned, Rodin 
uses this argument as grounds for rejecting the supposed right to national defense, at least insofar 
as it is understood as a defensive right.4 In later work, he draws a comparison with companies, 
like Cadbury, who have a distinctive culture that is threatened upon being bought out (or subject 
to a “hostile takeover,” as he puts it) by larger, more aggressive corporations (Rodin 2014). On 
his view, there is no significant moral difference between the value of communities like those at 
many companies, and those of nations. Just as it would be impermissible to use lethal force to 
defend against the forced changes to Cadbury’s workplace community, so too would it be 
impermissible to use lethal force to defend one’s sovereignty against external forces.  
These conclusions are extremely revisionist. Not only has the tradition of just war theory 
long held to the importance of national defense, but such a right is also central to the 
international law of armed conflict.5 Rodin is aware of this: his conclusions are, in his words, 
both “surprising and disconcerting” (Rodin 2002, p. 162).But as Lazar reminds us in his 
discussion of this case, one person’s reductio is another’s Q.E.D. (Lazar 2014, p. 19). And in my 
view, which of these two we take the bloodless invasion example to demonstrate is in large part 
determined by whether alternative accounts fare any better. Rodin’s Q.E.D., then, relies on his 
claims that collectivist alternatives are implausible. In sections 4 and 5, I will challenge Rodin on 
this point. Before doing so, however, I want first to discuss a more recent attempt to 
                                               
4 But see chapter 8, in which Rodin argues that military action against aggressor states may nevertheless 
be justified on alternative grounds—in particular, as an exercise of law enforcement. Rodin notes, 
however, that this would require a much more extensive international state than currently exists, and so 
would not likely qualify as a justified defense at present. 
5 See, for instance, Chapter VII, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.  
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accommodate the bloodless invasion example. 
2.2: Fabre’s Cosmopolitan Reductivist-Individualist Account 
Cecile Fabre argues for a cosmopolitan account of national defense on which individuals may be 
permitted to fight in defense of their purely political rights—or, what she calls, “jointly held 
rights to political self-determination and territorial integrity” (Fabre 2012).6 At the core of 
Fabre’s argument is the claim that individuals may use lethal force in defense of what is 
necessary for them to live a minimally decent life. This claim serves to widen the scope of 
permissible self-defense to include not merely direct threats against one’s life, but also certain 
non-lethal harms, such as unlawful invasions into one’s home and gross interference with certain 
sorts of valuable property. Most relevant to our present discussion is the idea that, on Fabre’s 
view, one of the ways a life can be rendered less than minimally decent is when one does not 
have “control over one’s social and political environment” (Fabre 2012, p. 19).  
It may look as though this claim allows her view to avoid the undesirable conclusion that 
wars against bloodless invasion are impermissible. However, I doubt Fabre can so easily avail 
herself of this conclusion for two reasons. First, it seems implausibly ad hoc to claim that 
bloodless invasions necessarily render an individual’s life less than minimally decent, at least 
when “minimally decent” is understood in the way Fabre generally uses it throughout her 
discussion. And in a more recent discussion, Fabre claims that sovereignty rights are “not 
important enough to justify the taking of lives”—that is, the lives of combatantsA, i.e., those who 
                                               
6 Like most other reductivist-individualists, cosmopolitans reject any special status that may be thought to 
accrue to collectives, such as states. Cosmopolitanism applies to domains outside of the ethics of war, and 
so is much more far-reaching than reductivist-individualism. Nevertheless, when we speak of 
cosmopolitanism about war, as we will at points throughout this essay, the two views are essentially in 
agreement. 
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carry out this threat (Fabre 2014, 104).7 
Moreover, it seems clear that Fabre herself sees control over one’s social and political 
environment as inapplicable to such cases, since her response to bloodless invasion cases is not 
to invoke this claim, which would seem to justify using lethal force, but rather to develop a new 
argument that attempts to justify the eventual use of force through a series of escalating 
intermediate uses of force. This argument, however, faces significant problems. It begins by 
introducing a distinction between two types of just cause: narrow and wide. As she puts it:  
A narrow just cause is a justification for killing wrongdoers, whilst a wide just cause is a 
justification for using non-lethal force even though one plausibly foresees that 
wrongdoers will counter this defensive move by lethal means—the use of which is not 
warranted and provides victims with a narrow just cause for killing (Fabre 2012, p. 70). 
 
So, suppose the combatants of country A—let us follow Fabre and refer to them as 
combatantsA—invade country V at T1, but will only use force (at T3) if combatantsV attempt to 
prevent their advance with force (at T2). On Fabre’s view, this gives combatantsV a wide just 
cause, which means they are only permitted to use non-lethal force at T2 in response to this 
initial act of aggression at T1. Then, if combatantsA respond to this with a threat of deadly force 
at T3, this gives combatantsV a narrow just cause, which permits them to use lethal force to 
defend themselves against combatantsA at T4. In other words, the initial threat by combatantsA is 
not, by itself, sufficient to grant combatantsV a permission to use lethal force, but it does warrant 
using other, less-than-lethal means. And if, as a result, combatantsA respond with a lethal threat, 
then combatantsV are permitted to defend themselves with lethal force. 
But it isn’t clear that the conclusion—i.e., that combatantsV are permitted to use lethal 
force at T4 in response to the lethal threat posed against them at T3—follows from Fabre’s basic 
claim. For if combatantsA’ threat is truly conditional—that is, if they will only attempt lethal 
                                               
7 Later in this piece, she writes, “it would be wrong of combatantsV to kill wrongdoersA in defence of their 
and their fellow citizens’ [sovereignty] rights” (108). 
 7 
force if combatantsV attempt to stop them from taking the territory—then even though they pose 
a lethal threat to combatantsV at T3, it is still open to V to capitulate to the threat—that is, by 
ceding the territory to A, and thereby forgoing any use of lethal force at T4.8  Indeed, this is what 
the standardly accepted criterion of necessity requires of them: since capitulating is, by Fabre’s 
own account, a less-harmful alternative available to combatantsV to secure the relevant benefits 
(in this case, avoiding the death of some combatantsV), they must choose capitulation over 
employing force. In her more recent discussion, Fabre adds that the defender may use lethal 
force at T2 “if [the defender] stands a higher chance of surviving the attack by killing [her 
aggressor] pre-emptively” (Fabre 2014, p. 110). But again, this is unnecessary: capitulation 
remains an option even when, and perhaps especially when, success in later defense is less likely. 
Even setting aside this problem, there are still other reasons to reject Fabre’s account. 
One such reason is that the move from a wide to narrow just cause fails to achieve its desired 
goal of justifying the use of lethal force in national defense. Recall that combatantsV may only 
use non-lethal force to repel a violation of V’s political self-determination. Once combatantsA 
respond with lethal force, however, combatantsV are then permitted to use lethal force to defend 
themselves. But notice that at this stage, the object of this lethal force is not the violation of V’s 
political self-determination, but rather the (unjust) threat combatantsA pose to the lives of 
combatantsV. It is therefore merely a case of self-defense. 
To see this more clearly, consider an analogous case from interpersonal morality. 
Suppose Alex trespasses on Vincent’s property. On Fabre’s account, Vincent is permitted to use 
some minimal level of non-lethal force to remove Alex from his property. Perhaps Vincent can 
                                               
8 (Rodin 2014) puts the point a slightly different way: “when a direct threat to a lesser interest ins 
accompanied by a contingent threat to a vital interest, this provides a moral reason not to defend the lesser 
interest, even if using the same level of defensive force would have been proportional, absent the 
contingent threat” (82). 
 8 
throw rocks in Alex’s general direction, or he could issue a proportionate shove. However, once 
Alex resists, wields a knife, and lunges towards Vincent, Vincent is permitted to use lethal force 
to protect his own life (supposing there are no other non-lethal alternatives available). But it can 
no longer be said that Vincent is using lethal force to prevent Alex from trespassing on his 
property; rather, Vincent is simply defending his own life, as he is permitted to do when 
necessary to thwart an unjust threat. The issue with Alex’s trespassing is of course causally 
relevant to the scenario, but it would not be accurate to say that it is the relevant end of Vincent’s 
defensive action. The same is true of our international case as well: combatantsV act merely in 
individual self-defense—and not national defense—when they repel a threat of lethal force from 
combatantsA. In doing so, combatantsV might also happen to prevent a violation to V’s self-
determination. But on Fabre’s account, this could only be a side effect of their action. 
Even if Fabre’s account can somehow overcome these objections, it would still only 
secure a very indirect and conditional sort of national defense: V would only be permitted to use 
lethal force when combatantsA employ force that threatens to render the lives of the citizens in V 
less than minimally decent. And yet, many have the intuition that states are permitted to use 
lethal force in a wider range of cases than this. As such, our present quarry is a stronger sort of 
view: whereas Fabre’s view can secure, at most, a weak national defense, we should look for a 
view that can accommodate a robust national defense. On this sort of view, the use of lethal 
force against even a bloodless invasion may be proportionate—and therefore, subject to certain 
other constraints, sometimes permissible.  
3. Desiderata for a Collectivist Account 
The foregoing discussion has attempted to illustrate the ways in which two prominent 
reductivist-individualist accounts fail to capture a sufficiently robust version of national defense. 
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This conclusion invites us to consider whether an alternative account might fare better. But what 
form must such an alternative account take in order to be successful? Seth Lazar has recently 
outlined several desiderata for such an account (Lazar 2014, pp. 33–37). I will discuss the two 
desiderata I take to be most central—namely, that such a view must invoke collective or 
impersonal goods, and that it must provide an account of national partiality.  
First, in order to accommodate national defense in cases like the bloodless invasion 
example, an alternative account will need to show how the use of lethal force in response to the 
initial threat can be justified. As we saw, reductivist-individualists like Rodin and Fabre are 
committed to saying that such force would be impermissible, since on their view, the use of 
lethal force in defense of one’s purely political rights is disproportionate. A non-reductive-
individualist alternative, therefore, must explain how such force would in fact be proportionate. 
Lazar points out that the most promising way of doing so would be to introduce collective or 
impersonal goods, such as the collective right to self-determination, or the irreducible value of 
solidarity. Moreover, such an account must offer an explanation for why such goods are of 
sufficient value to render proportionate the use of lethal force in their defense.9 
Second, a plausible non-reductive-individualist alternative must defend a certain kind of 
national partiality. This idea can be understood in at least two ways. The first concerns 
interpersonal relationships among compatriots, such as whether or not it is permissible to give 
greater weight to our compatriots’ lives and interests than to those of outsiders. In what follows, 
however, I will focus instead on a different kind of national partiality—namely, the preference 
that we (as a state) can show to our own state as such. This sort of partiality can manifest itself in 
several ways. For example, a state is sometimes permitted to direct resources toward securing or 
                                               
9 Of course, some philosophers claim that such force is proportionate while also endorsing an 
individualist approach. Though in many ways persuasive, such views are not without problems. 
Unfortunately, I don’t have the space to treat this point in the present context. 
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protecting certain collective goods, like preserving its cultural heritage, instead of directing these 
resources toward, e.g., international aid programs, even if the latter would provide greater goods 
overall, when viewed impartially.10 Or, recall the case we considered earlier, when discussing 
Fabre’s account. Without a permission to prefer our own way of doing things, or our own 
political self-determination as such, we would be forced to capitulate to any aggressors, like the 
one from the example, who would make us better (or at least no worse) off than we currently 
are.11 In my view, this is a conclusion we ought to reject, and the alternative view I shall sketch 
in the following sections will provide the resources for doing so. In what follows, I shall focus on 
cases of this particular sort, though some of what I say will have relevance for the other cases. 
4. Collective Goods 
Just as any account of interpersonal partiality (e.g., between parent and child or among friends) 
must make reference to the relevant goods in question (e.g., the intrinsic or instrumental value of 
the relationship), so too must an account of national partiality explain the goods that are its 
object. As such, I will offer a brief sketch of these goods—which, on my view, must be 
collective in nature. Before turning to this, however, let me first discuss a problem for the 
individualistic approach to these goods. 
4.1 Against Mere Aggregation 
One significant problem with individualism is that it generates counter-intuitive results when we 
aggregate the values within states and compare them to other states (Lazar 2014, pp. 30–31). To 
take a simple case, suppose that state A has one million citizens and state B has two million 
                                               
10 This is a controversial claim, and I don’t intend to defend it here. My point is simply that there are other 
sorts of actions and scenarios that could reasonably be labeled as cases of national partiality.  
11 There are, to be sure, limits to the exercise of this partiality. In particular, states that fail to satisfy a 
certain threshold of value will have a correspondingly diminished right to exercise this partiality. I shall 
have much more to say on this point when I discuss national partiality in greater detail in section 5. 
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citizens. If the value of the state is just reducible to the aggregate value of the individuals that 
comprise it—and if we assume that, all else being equal, individuals are of (at least roughly) 
equal moral value—then it seems we must conclude that B is (roughly) twice as valuable as A.12 
This is because the value of the constituents of B adds up to more than those of A—twice as 
much, in fact—and therefore, B has more total value than A. This conclusion will strike many as 
implausible. I find it hard to accept that, all else being equal, Australia (with a population of 
about 23 million) is of more value than New Zealand (with a population of about 4.5 million)—
and certainly not of five times more value.13 On its own, this may not be that troubling a 
conclusion; indeed, it is one most individualists will welcome. The problems start to appear, 
however, as soon as we consider what this type of conclusion can and cannot justify.  
For one thing, while certain reductivist-individualists like Rodin deny national defense in 
bloodless invasion cases, others, like Helen Frowe, argue that citizens’ political rights may in 
some cases be sufficiently strong, when taken in aggregate, to override the prohibition on using 
lethal force (Frowe 2015). As she puts it:  
I don’t think that I may kill you to stop you from breaking my arm. But if you’re going to 
break lots of people’s arms, it seems to me that there will come a point at which these 
harms can aggregate to make it proportionate to kill you to prevent them (of course, other 
conditions such as necessity would also need to be satisfied for killing you to be overall 
permissible)[…] I think this is also true when it comes to my political rights (Frowe 
2015, p. 187). 
Thus, while each individual right of this sort is comparatively weak, and does not suffice to 
justify using lethal force, a significant enough number of violations of this right will justify such 
                                               
12 There are, of course, several imprecisions here. Nevertheless, I think it serves to show the general 
worry about aggregation. 
13 Of course, in some cases, population size taken in aggregate does matter. For example, if we could save 
either Australia or New Zealand—but not both—from an imminent catastrophic natural disaster that 
would wipe out each nation’s entire population, most of us would think that we ought to save Australia in 
virtue of the larger number of individuals that would be saved as a result. I do not think this constitutes an 
objection to the view I endorse here; there is nothing in what I’ve said that precludes my account from 
fitting with these intuitions. 
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force.  
While this view avoids the difficulty that other reductivist-individualist views, like 
Rodin’s have in being unable to explain the justification to resist bloodless invasions, this view 
introduces a new set of problems. For one thing, this aggregative approach would confer a 
systematic advantage on larger states merely in virtue of their population size. To see why, 
imagine that state A and state B—the same two states from the previous example—are identical 
in every way, with the exception of their population size—which, recall, is one million people in 
A and two million people in B. As such, when we calculate whether or not each state is permitted 
to use lethal force in its defense, the only unique variable between them will be the aggregate 
value of the individuals of each state—for A: x, and for B: 2x (assuming a positive, non-zero 
value for x). And it seems that, within a certain range of possible cases, the value of 2x in B’s 
calculation will be sufficient to justify force, while A’s total (with x alone) will remain 
insufficient.14 In cases of this sort, B is permitted to use lethal force in its defense while A is not, 
and this would be so in virtue of B’s population size alone. Therefore, an individualist account 
that aggregates in this way will systematically favor larger states like B over smaller states like 
A. This is implausible.15 Surely the right to defend against unjust aggression, even bloodless 
invasions, should not depend in this way on the country’s population size. 
In response to this, it may seem more reasonable to claim that there is some general 
threshold of value beyond which the use of lethal force is permissible, but below which it is not. 
                                               
14 To put this a bit more mathematically: Suppose the disvalue of using lethal force has some value, y. 
(Let’s also assume, as the individualist does, that x and y are measured along the same metric.) So, there 
is some range of cases such that 2x>y but x<y.  
15 Compare Walzer (1977, 253): “But communities, in emergencies, seem to have different and larger 
prerogatives. I am not sure that I can account for the difference, without ascribing to communal life a kind 
of transcendence that I don’t believe it to have. Perhaps it is only a matter of arithmetic: individuals 
cannot kill other individuals to save themselves, but to save a nation we can violate the rights of a 
determinate but smaller number of people. But then large nations and small ones would have different 
entitlements in such cases, and I doubt very much that this is true.” 
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Perhaps once a state has a population over, say, two million, it can be said to have a sufficient 
value such that lethal force is permitted. In other words, perhaps two million of these political 
rights taken in aggregate are enough to overcome the prohibition on using force in national 
defense. This idea, however, invites several familiar objections to cases in which thresholds are 
applied to phenomena that vary only in degree. For one thing, we ought to ask what makes such 
a threshold of permission normatively significant: What’s so special about this threshold rather 
than some other one? Moreover, we ought to consider the implications of this claim for marginal 
cases. For instance, this claim has the strange implication that a medium-sized state could lose its 
right to use lethal force in defense of its political self-determination in the middle of a battle, if 
casualties reach a certain point such that their civilian total falls below the threshold. Perhaps 
there are certain reasons for thinking that a high number of casualties is morally relevant in such 
cases; this is, after all, a basic feature of the proportionality calculation. But I see no compelling 
reason for thinking it determines the status of the more general right to political self-
determination in this way. States are justified in using lethal force to defend themselves even 
doing so will cost many of their own soldiers’ lives in the process. 
To be clear, I do not mean to deny that some amount of aggregation must be part of any 
view of national defense, collectivist or otherwise. For one thing, proportionality is inherently 
aggregative. What I do deny, however, is the idea that the goods at stake in national defense 
should be understood merely as aggregated individual rights. Let me now offer a proposal for 
how a collectivist view can better explain the justification for national defense.16  
                                               
16 To be sure, this is not the only possible approach. There are other views according to which we can 
recognize the value of the collective, such as those that emerge from the social contract tradition. The 
classic defense of a view that most closely approximates this is found in Rousseau, but more recent 
defenses of views inspired by the classic versions of the social contract view that connect with the points I 
raise here include (Benbaji 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012; Benbaji and Statman 2019; Statman 2015). Thank 
you to a reviewer for pointing out this connection. 
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4.2 In Defense of Collective Goods 
Collective goods are prevalent throughout all corners of human activity; this much is difficult to 
deny. Consider the following non-state example—which, though disanalogous from the state 
case in certain respects, should nevertheless helpfully illustrate the basic point. Imagine the New 
York Philharmonic masterfully playing a beautiful selection. Such a collective produces a value 
(e.g., harmony) that extends beyond the aggregate total of all the contributions of the individual 
musicians. Of course, this harmony cannot be achieved without these individuals’ contributions. 
But it doesn’t follow from this that the value of what they create together is necessarily a mere 
aggregation of each of their inputs. Rather, when certain conditions obtain (i.e., precise 
coordination, every musician’s complete mastery of her instrument, etc.), the whole becomes 
something greater than the sum of their individual parts. 
This point about certain collectives having a value greater than the sum of their parts is 
what G.E. Moore called the “principle of organic unities”. The basic idea, in Moore’s own 
words, is that, “the value of such a whole bears no regular proportion to the sum of the values of 
its parts”, and that, “The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the 
values of its parts” (Moore 1903, pp. 27–28). Moore’s primary example is the value that arises 
out of conscious contemplation of a beautiful object.17 On his view, when combined in the right 
sort of way, the two constituent parts—namely, the existence of beauty itself and conscious 
contemplation of (what the beholder takes to be) a beautiful object—generate an overall value 
that is greater than their mere aggregation. For Moore, the value of each part remains the same 
whether it is part of an organic unity or independent of it, and the additional value emerges from 
the combination of the two parts as a whole. In other words, if two parts A and B, with values of 
                                               
17 Moore’s example is that the conscious perception of the beautiful object is intrinsically valuable, 
which, though it may be true in that case, needn’t be assumed to be true in the state case on which we’re 
primarily focused. 
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x and y, respectively, are combined to form an organic unity, then the value of each part taken 
individually must be added to their value taken as a whole—say, z. Thus, the value of the whole 
is x + y + z, a value greater than the mere sum of x + y.  
This same point can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to many states or nations. That is, 
when individuals join together to form a state, this unification can sometimes yield an overall 
value greater than the sum of the values of its parts, i.e., its individual members. This is the result 
of the collective projects that citizens undertake together within the context of a particular 
political society, and it is determined by the value of the collective goods they together produce. 
And so, on this view, the value of the state as a whole is, in certain cases, greater than the sum of 
its constituent parts, since an effective state generates collective goods that cannot be entirely 
reduced to the individual citizens themselves.  
To be clear, this approach allows that the overall value of larger states will be greater 
than that of smaller states. After all, the initial values are greater—there are more people in larger 
states—and the values only increase on this model; so we should expect this conclusion. My 
point is not that the organic unity approach renders all states equal in value in all ways, no matter 
their size; this would be implausible. Rather, I am suggesting that the collective goods of a state 
have a distinct value that does not rely on direct aggregation from the individuals that comprise 
it: subject to a range of constraints (e.g., minimally just), the additional value—namely, z—is 
roughly similar for all states, and does not shift in accordance with changes to its population. It is 
this point that allows us to resist the appeal to straightforward aggregation of reductive-
individualism. 
This approach to the value of an organic unity is what Thomas Hurka calls the “holistic 
interpretation” (Hurka 1998). This is the view Moore endorses, but it is not the only possible 
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interpretation. Another, which Hurka calls the “conditionality interpretation”, says that there is 
no value attributed to the whole as a whole; rather, their being combined in this way changes the 
value of one or both of the constituent parts to create a value greater than the two values taken 
independently. In other words, the two parts A and B have values of x and y respectively, prior to 
their combination. But when these two parts are unified, the value of each becomes p and q 
respectively, where either p > x, or q > y, or both. Although the two interpretations do not differ 
with respect to their verdicts on the overall value of a given organic unity, it is important to note 
that they do differ with respect to how they differ with respect to the value they attribute to the 
parts of the whole. In rejecting the idea of an emergent value, the conditionality interpretation is 
much more palatable to those with reductivist sympathies. Thus, defenders of that approach 
might agree with the appeal to organic unities, but deny the specifics of the approach I take here. 
Yet I think in this context, we should follow Moore in assuming the holistic approach. 
This is because the conditionality interpretation appears to require that the constituent parts of 
the whole must increase in value once they become part of the whole. But it is implausible that 
individuals might come to have greater value themselves once they are part of a state. For one 
thing, this implies that stateless persons are of less value than those who belong to states. More 
generally, it is hard to understand why we should think that the change in value occurs at the 
individual level. 
At any rate, the foregoing is not the only way of defending an account of collective goods 
that is not strictly aggregative, in the way the reductive-individualists suggest; but it offers an 
intuitively plausible alternative to that approach. The next question to ask is: What exactly are 
these supposed “collective goods” as applied to the state? In the remainder of this section, I shall 
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offer a very general sketch.18  
A helpful place to begin is with the arguments of those who reject such goods. In his 
discussion, Rodin claims that the most plausible version of non-reductivism is one that argues 
that states possess the right of national defense in order to defend against violations of their 
“common life”. He canvasses several interpretations of this idea, such as state legitimacy, and its 
culture and history.19 State legitimacy, he says, cannot ground the right to national defense 
because it offers no reasons for defending our legitimate state as such when threatened by those 
who would also impose an alternative legitimate state.20 What makes a state legitimate, on his 
view, is its ability to provide some level of order over the affairs of its citizens. And since there 
may be a case in which an intervening state would more effectively provide order over our 
affairs, we cannot appeal to the ability of our present state to do so as a justification for the use of 
force against this threat.21 This thought points to a more general worry that accounts of this sort 
                                               
18 It is important to keep in mind that different types of collectives will generate altogether different 
collective goods. Surely whatever collective goods a beautifully conducted orchestra brings about are 
different not just in degree but also in kind from those brought about by a political collective like a well-
functioning state. Accordingly, a one-size-fits-all approach to collective goods would be inappropriate. 
19 Rodin also mentions and rejects the idea that self-determination and autonomy provide plausible 
grounds for the right of national defense, though his reasons for rejecting it are somewhat obscure. His 
primary target is Walzer’s view of self-determination, which holds that intervention is always wrong, for 
the exercise of state autonomy is of paramount importance in creating and sustaining a political system 
that is, as he puts it, “commensurate with one’s national culture, even if this results in an illiberal and 
authoritarian regime” (Walzer 1977, p. 87). Rodin argues that such a view requires several dubious 
claims, such as reducing political self-determination to morally arbitrary factors like the ability 
(understood descriptively) to coerce others. But while Walzer’s view has been quite influential, I see no 
reason for assuming that it is the best representative for a view about political self-determination. Indeed, 
to base one’s rejection of the good of political self-determination on Walzer’s account of it is to ignore the 
many subtleties and moderate versions of the account that many have defended. Walzer’s account is by 
no means a defense of the constitutive features of any plausible view of political self-determination. 
20 It is worth noting, however, that while both the goods of culture and history and those of political self-
determination will vary in degree (the former more so than the latter), the good of legitimacy appears to 
be a threshold case. The upshot of this is that even states that don’t pass the threshold of legitimacy, they 
can still have sufficient goods of the other two kinds to warrant the use of defensive force.  
21 It is perhaps odd that Rodin argues for this point with this particular view of legitimacy in mind, for it 
strikes me as somewhat tendentious. In particular, I see no reason for thinking that legitimacy is best 
understood this way. If instead we understand legitimacy as having something to do with consent to a 
 18 
often face: If a state’s right to resist political aggression is grounded in its ability to secure 
certain goods—that is, if it is understood as instrumentally valuable—then the right will cease to 
apply in cases in which the intervening state can equally or better secure those goods. 
Rodin also rejects the second interpretation—a state’s culture and shared history—in two 
different ways. He first argues that the value of a particular culture or shared history offers a 
subjective rather than objective value. This is because, given the nature of these goods, there is 
no reason to suppose that those who are external to the state in question must appreciate and 
respect their value. As I will explain in section 5, Rodin’s claim here fails to appreciate that a 
plausible account of agent-relative permissions is one on which such permissions can be 
endorsed objectively. That is, to reject a view of this sort, it is not enough to point out that some 
particular good has a subjective character; rather, one must show that this good is not such that it 
can be valued objectively at all. The challenge, then, is to explain how these goods can be 
understood as appropriately objectively valuable. 
In his more recent writing, Rodin has argued that the idea of a common life understood in 
this way fails to offer a justification for national defense because not because it is incoherent, but 
because it is of insufficient moral value to justify the harms it causes, particularly to innocents 
(Rodin 2014). As I noted briefly in section 2.1, Rodin arrives at this conclusion by drawing an 
analogy with certain companies. Like nations, many companies have values and a shared history, 
and they sometimes face threats from the outside—e.g., being purchased by a conglomerate, 
being put out of business, etc. Rodin denies that there are any morally significant differences 
between nations and companies on this point, so we ought to treat them similarly. Since no one 
would claim that a company is justified in defending itself with lethal force against such threats, 
                                                                                                                                                       
particular system—and not just any system that will achieve a minimum level of order—then our worries 
about the intervening state seem appropriately placed.  
 19 
we should conclude similarly for nations as well. 
This more recent argument poses an important challenge for any defender of national 
defense, as it calls for further discussion of both the weight of national goods, and the 
distinctiveness of nations as opposed to other collectives. I do not have the space to take up these 
arguments here, though I believe Rodin’s challenge can be met.22 Since my task in this essay is 
merely to provide the framework for a collectivist view, and not to answer all objections to its 
application, we can postpone discussion of this point for now.  
So, to recap: Rodin’s two most central reasons for rejecting the non-reductivist approach 
founded upon the value of the “common life” are that such a view cannot explain why we are 
permitted to prefer our own state non-instrumentally, and such goods are valuable only 
subjectively rather than objectively.23 The challenge, then, is to provide an account of collective 
goods that can avoid these pitfalls. It is essential to notice, however, that there is nothing inherent 
in these three variants of the idea of collective goods that necessarily entails their failing to 
overcome these problems. Rather, these problems, at least as Rodin discusses them, seem to stem 
largely from either explanatory incompleteness or one’s prior commitments to other principles. 
Of course, to claim that a view provides no explanation for some phenomenon can be read as an 
invitation to provide such an explanation, rather than as an objection to the view as such.24 Thus, 
the most promising response to Rodin’s challenge is to be found not in providing more detail 
                                               
22 For one thing, Rodin makes short shrift of the idea that a nation is a more wholly encompassing 
collective—one that secures and encourages a more thoroughgoing way of life. It is precisely for this 
reason that many see greater value in nations as opposed to companies. 
23 In Rodin (2014), he takes a somewhat different tack. He argues that we do not afford defensive rights to 
certain other non-state communities, such as companies, even when they have what appear to be the same 
or other relevant features (intimacy, communal values, etc.). I do not have the space here to reply directly 
to this argument; however, I think the arguments I make herein will be an important step toward rebutting 
his argument. 
24 And such an explanation’s failure to accord with one’s prior commitments—e.g., to a certain view 
about when lethal force is permissible—do not count decisively in favor of rejecting the explanation, and 
instead may count against a view with such commitments. 
 20 
about the goods themselves, but rather in elucidating the additional aspects that are necessary for 
a complete defense of collective goods.  
5. National Partiality 
The second desideratum for a plausible non-reductive-individualist alternative is that it must 
defend some account of national partiality. By now, it should be clearer why this is so. As we 
just saw, none of the most plausible ways of defending collective goods can explain on their own 
why a state would be permitted to defend itself against regimes that would be at least as 
successful in securing these goods. Thus, a plausible alternative account must make adequate 
room for the idea of national partiality. In order to overcome Rodin’s objections, the account 
must not only explain why we are permitted to prefer our own state non-instrumentally, but also 
why the goods in question can be valued from an objective standpoint. The goal of this section is 
to offer a sketch of such an account.  
 Before turning to this task, I first want to mention a possible objection. As I said in 
section 3, national partiality can be understood in two ways: either as the preference we show 
toward our compatriots over outsiders, or the preference we can show to our own state as such. 
The focus of the following discussion will be the latter of these two.25 Some may object to my 
characterizing national partiality in this way. To see why, recall that one of the central features of 
this characterization is that states are permitted to resist even those interventions that will leave 
them better off (or at least no worse off). According to the objection, it is true that states are 
permitted to resist such interventions; however, it isn’t the idea of national partiality that explains 
this—rather, it is the more basic right to resist paternalistic interference. And this difference is 
                                               
25 While I suspect there are compelling reasons to support partiality among compatriots, this question is 
somewhat orthogonal to our present inquiry, so I shall leave it aside for now. But, see my concluding 
section for some thoughts about this point. 
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significant, for the two differ with respect to the permissions they afford to third parties. As with 
other forms of partiality, national partiality permits only the state under threat to resist; third 
parties are not permitted to do so. However, the objection goes, the right against paternalism is 
not restricted to the agent in this way; indeed, it also permits third parties to intervene to prevent 
the intervention. That this is so can be seen by an appeal to our intuitions about interpersonal 
cases: Al is permitted to resist Bob’s paternalistic interference, but so too is Charles; and this is 
because preventing paternalistic acts is a right afforded to all, even those not directly affected by 
the act (like Charles). Thus, the objection holds that what I’m calling “national partiality” is 
really not a form of partiality at all, but rather, a specific instantiation of the more general (agent-
neutral) right of a state (and third-party states) to resist paternalistic intervention. 
 To fully treat this objection would require an investigation into the nature of permissions 
to resist paternalism; however, this would take us too far afield. Instead, let me offer three very 
brief points that I hope will help to disarm the objection. First, I suspect that the objection gets 
much of its bite from an appeal to intuitions about interpersonal cases of this sort. Of course, this 
isn’t itself problematic. However, if these intuitions are caused by one’s existing commitment to 
the notion that the ethical principles applicable at the interpersonal level must also be those 
applicable at the international level, then this assumes reductivism from the start, and would 
seem to simply beg the question against my view.  
Second, regardless of the source of these intuitions, I don’t see any obvious reason for 
endorsing them. Indeed, it seems to me entirely plausible to say that, both in interpersonal and 
international cases, only the party subject to the paternalistic action is permitted to resist (unless, 
of course, this party has requested assistance, or if others have preexisting agent-relative 
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permissions to aid this party already). 26  Finally, even if the right to resist paternalistic 
interference is what grounds the permission to resist the intervention—which, of course, I want 
to resist—national partiality might still have a role to play at the level of determining what 
responses are proportionate and for whom. That is, suppose A is permitted to prevent B’s 
paternalistic intervention, and C is permitted to do so as well. Even so, it may be that A is 
permitted to use greater force than C in order to thwart B’s intervention. If this is right, then even 
if it isn’t the entire explanation for a state’s permission to resist paternalistic interference, 
national partiality nevertheless still has an important role to play. 
 Let us set aside this worry and turn now to the central task of this section—namely, 
offering a defense of national partiality. There are myriad views on offer that defend some 
version of national partiality (Hurka 1997; Lazar 2013; Miller 1995, 2005; Scheffler 1995; 
Seglow 2013; Tan 2004). But rather than assuming one of these views at the outset, I want to 
begin by considering certain arguments from the ethics of self-defense.27 Consider the following 
case, adapted from Robert Nozick: 
Innocent Threat: Alex has been pushed from a tall building and will land on Vincent, 
killing him in the process, if nothing is done to stop him. Alex is morally innocent of this 
threat. Unfortunately for Vincent, he cannot move or otherwise employ less-than-lethal 
means to prevent Alex’s threat. Fortunately, though, he wields a special gun that could 
                                               
26 Indeed, depending on how the circumstances of the case are presented, it might reasonably be thought 
that a general permission to resist paternalistic actions would necessarily yield further cases of 
paternalistic action. This is because if C intervenes to (ostensibly) help A resist B, then it looks as though 
C is, in at least one relevant sense, interfering paternalistically in A’s affairs. Whether this is so, of course, 
depends on the particular way of defining paternalism. 
27 Of course, one plausible non-reductive-individualist approach would be to argue that the state is 
analogous to the individual in self-defense cases, and thus, the permissions afforded to individuals in self-
defense cases are analogous (mutatis mutandis) in cases of national defense. This sort of approach—
sometimes referred to as the domestic analogy—is one favored by certain just war theorists, most notably 
(Walzer 1977). I do not discuss this view in what follows, primarily because my focus here is on 
providing a view in contrast to both Rodin’s and Fabre’s respective accounts. I should say, though, that I 
see my collectivist account as being distinct from Walzer’s in several important respects. For one thing, I 
want to deny his view that states have a right to defend themselves regardless of the value of the goods 
they can be said to have produced.  
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vaporize Alex, preventing him from killing Vincent (Nozick 1974, p. 34). 
 
Is Vincent permitted to use the gun, or must he allow himself to be killed by Alex? There is 
hardly any philosophical consensus on this question, though there are many views are on offer. 
Some philosophers believe that, since the threat Alex poses comes about through no fault of his 
own, he cannot be said to have done anything to make himself liable to being killed (McMahan 
2009a). Since Alex is not liable to being harmed, it would be wrong for Vincent to harm him. 
Others believe that Vincent is not permitted to kill Alex because Alex is morally equivalent to a 
bystander, and we are not permitted to kill bystanders (Otsuka 1994). Some philosophers, 
however, defend the opposite conclusion. One prominent view of this type holds that, though 
Alex is not liable to being harmed, he is nevertheless the threatening object, and so may be 
permissibly killed (Frowe 2008; Tadros 2011, pp. 253–255). 
While there are many possible views, the bulk of them focus primarily on the moral 
status of the attacker to determine whether or not the victim is permitted to defend himself 
(Davis 1984; Quong 2009). By doing so, these accounts fail to adequately respect the limits of 
what victims can be morally required to do in such cases. Jonathan Quong puts the point this 
way: 
Your life is your own, and so morality does not require that you give it up or put it at 
significant risk for another person or even several other people. By appealing to the 
agent-relative value each person’s life has for them, I therefore mean nothing more than 
the following: that each person is understood to have a powerful agent-relative 
permission to avoid sacrificing or significantly risking their own life for the sake of 
others (absent any obligations voluntarily incurred) (Quong 2009, pp. 516–517).  
 
On Quong’s view, we ought to conclude that, since Vincent has done nothing to forfeit his right 
not to be harmed (nor, incidentally, has he done anything to be liable to being harmed), and 
adding the fact that he has an agent-relative permission to avoid self-sacrifice, he is therefore 
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permitted to use lethal force in defense of his life.28  
 I think Quong is right here, and I think we can extend his point even further. The core of 
his agent-relative permission in such cases is the idea that, “the permission to act in self-defense 
is justified by appeal to the agent-relative value that each person’s life has for them” (Quong 
2009, p. 516). But one’s own life is by no means the only thing of considerable agent-relative 
value. To see this, consider the following variation on Innocent Threat: 
Innocent Threat 2: The circumstances are identical to Innocent Threat, except it is not 
Vincent but Vincent’s wife, Valerie, who wields the vaporizer gun. No lesser harmful 
means are available to either Vincent or Valerie for preventing Alex’s threat from being 
realized.  
 
My intuition is that Valerie is permitted to kill Alex in defense of Vincent’s life. And the 
justification seems to be of the same general sort as that which Quong provides in Innocent 
Threat—namely, an appeal to agent-relative value. The only difference now is that the object of 
value is not the agent’s own life, but rather, the life of an individual with whom one stands in a 
particularly valuable sort of relationship. And as this case illustrates, the agent-relative value that 
a marital relationship confers will often be of nearly the same general strength as the value to 
oneself of one’s own life—and sometimes even greater.  
In other words, Quong’s agent-relative permission can—and in my view, should—be 
expanded to include more than merely a permission to defend one’s own life. Indeed, since 
agent-relative permissions are grounded in agent-relative values, and many agent-relative values 
                                               
28 It may be objected that Quong’s example is simply inapplicable to the cases with which we are 
presently concerned. That is, while his case involves an innocent threat, the bloodless invasion example—
and probably all historical examples of political aggression—involves a threat from an aggressor who 
does not resemble the innocent threat. In response to this, let me make two brief points. First, I don’t see 
anything inherently problematic in extracting from Quong’s example his description of agent-relative 
permissions, even if I take them to apply to a different sort of case than the one he describes. And second, 
even if it is true that, as a matter of historical fact, all cases of political aggression have involved non-
innocent aggressors, I see no evidence for thinking this is a necessary truth; it seems possible to conceive 
of a case of intervention in which the intervening party more closely resembles the innocent threat of 
Quong’s example.  
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extend beyond one’s own life and limb, it seems we ought to conclude that individuals 
sometimes have agent-relative permissions to defend certain of these agent-relative values with 
lethal force.29 Call this the wide agent-relative permissions thesis. As it stands, this claim is 
considerably underspecified. Unfortunately, I cannot offer here a thoroughgoing defense of all 
features of the view; however, I shall nevertheless discuss some of those most salient to our 
present discussion.  
First, in its current state, the thesis seems to entail that all agent-relative values are 
candidates for generating agent-relative permissions. But this cannot be right, for surely an 
individual’s perverse values cannot ground moral permissions to use lethal force in their defense. 
Moreover, if my account allowed any agent-relative values to ground such permissions, it would 
fall victim to the charge that Rodin has issued against views of this sort, which I aim to avoid—
namely, that such views only identify subjective values. As such, an explanation is needed for 
how the wide agent-relative permissions thesis can overcome this problem.  
I believe the explanation can be found in a closer inspection of the contours of agent-
relativity. Notice that a permission can be both agent-relative and objective. To say that a 
permission is agent-relative is just to say that it is indexed to a particular individual; outsiders 
generally do not have similar permissions—or, at any rate, certainly not permissions of the same 
strength as that of the individual herself. But the permission is also objective in that all can 
reasonably endorse it, or can see it as providing the individual (and all others in the 
                                               
29 There is an interesting related question concerning the distinction between defending and attacking to 
prevent threats. On my view, thus far described, it may seem that there is no difference: if a state has an 
agent-relative permission to defend itself against threats to its collective goods, then it would seem it also 
has an agent-relative permission to attack to prevent these threats. But notice that such permissions are 
also constrained by the other standard criteria for just action in war; and typically, threats for which one 
would need to attack rather than defend haven’t yet satisfied the criterion of necessity. 
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circumstances) with a justification to so act.30 And the same general point also applies to agent-
relative values: the value of an agent’s own life to her is something that is both indexed to that 
agent—and so, in the circumstances in which there is no further agent-neutral permission to 
defend it, third parties may not be permitted to intervene to defend it on her behalf—as well as 
the sort of value that outsiders can endorse.  
Some alleged agent-relative permissions, however, might indeed be nothing more than 
subjective, either because they are based on agent-relative values that are not objectively 
endorsable, or because, though the value is objectively endorsable, the proposed defense of this 
would be objectively disproportionate. For example, the agent-relative value of a particular 
agent’s pursuit of human trafficking certainly cannot be objectively endorsed. And whatever the 
agent-relative value may be of eliminating irritations, it would certainly be disproportionate to 
kill those whom one finds irritating, which means that one would not possess an objective 
permission to do so. 
The foregoing points suggest the following limitation on agent-relative permissions: one 
has an (objective) agent-relative permission to perform some act only if the agent-relative value 
in question is the sort of value that can be objectively endorsed. I realize that this is still 
somewhat underspecified. After all, exactly what sorts of value can be objectively endorsed? I 
am unable to offer much a sufficiently precise explanation, but I think it is relatively clear in 
most cases. Consider again our earlier spousal example. What drives our intuition that Valerie is 
permitted to kill Alex in defense of her husband Vincent in Innocent Threat 2 is that the goods 
under threat—namely, those that emerge from her and Vincent’s marital relationship—are of 
considerable value, both agent-relatively and objectively. But we will surely be inclined to 
                                               
30 In other words, agent-relative permissions should not be construed as merely offering excuses for 
certain actions, but rather, justifications so to act. 
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conclude differently if Vincent is not Valerie’s husband but rather her next-door neighbor. 
Whatever goods may be thought to exist between neighbors are typically of considerably lower 
(objective) value than those that exist between devoted spouses.31 For this reason, while Valerie 
may permissibly exercise this level of partiality towards her husband, she may not do so towards 
her neighbor.  
Some may be inclined to posit an additional criterion for permissible partiality—namely, 
that the ties between the agents in question be sufficiently strong. On this view, part of why it is 
permissible for me to show greater partiality towards my sibling than my second cousin twice 
removed is the fact that I have (we can suppose) established considerably greater ties with the 
former than the latter.32 But while this may be true in many cases, I suspect this is more due to 
the nature of the particular goods in question rather than evidence of a separate criterion that 
necessarily must be satisfied. In many relationships—such as those that occur between family 
members or among friends—securing the relevant goods often requires the establishment of 
close ties. In the friendship case, for example, this closeness is constitutive of the relationship; it 
is therefore difficult to imagine the goods of that relationship without it. But not all relationships 
require this level of connection. Members of certain solidarity movements, for example, may 
show certain levels of partiality towards those with whom they stand together, even if they have 
no deep interpersonal ties between them.33 More generally, many collectives can secure the 
                                               
31 This would change, of course, if the two became friends. Surely the goods that emerge between good 
friends are candidates for objective endorsement. 
32 Of course, it’s not difficult to imagine cases in which I am estranged from my sister but quite close with 
my (nominally) ‘distant’ relatives. 
33 Of course, the value of the goods in jeopardy determines the level of force permissible. Thus, the value 
of goods of solidarity among, say, members of the Occupy Wall Street movement was not sufficiently 
high to justify the use of lethal force against those who sought to disrupt their unity. Also, it is important 
to remember that, when discussing cases of this sort, I am only concerned with the partiality a collective 
(or members of that collective) may show to the collective. So, the question of what amount of partiality 
individuals within a collective may show to another member qua member must be set aside for another 
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goods relevant to them without such ties; in my view, the state or nation is a good candidate for 
one such collective. As such, this additional requirement—that, in addition to securing the goods 
of the relationship, members of such collectives also establish these ties between them before 
partiality is permissible—would be superfluous in many cases, and unnecessarily limiting in 
others, and must therefore be rejected. 
I mention this point because it seems to provide the basis for an intuitively appealing way 
of rejecting national partiality. It is sometimes thought that the ties between compatriots are far 
too weak to justify national partiality (Hurka 1997). After all, I haven’t met, nor will I ever meet, 
most of my compatriots. As such, the ties between compatriots seem considerably weaker than 
those between, say, siblings or spouses.34 To invoke national partiality as the reason for why I’m 
permitted to use lethal force in their defense will therefore strike many as troubling. But as I have 
just argued, this point ought to be recast as one about the value of the goods under threat. And if 
what I have argued for earlier regarding the collective goods that emerge within a state is correct, 
it is not at all obvious that we ought to resist the invocation of national partiality in such cases.  
This example, and much of the foregoing discussion, has concerned the question of the 
whether or not lethal force is permissible in cases where it is necessary to prevent lethal harm. I 
have tried to show that partiality generates special permissions that stem from agent-relative 
values: The more (objectively) valuable the goods in question, the stronger the (agent-relative) 
permission to act in defense of such goods. And certainly, a threat to the life of someone with 
whom I stand in a certain sort of valuable relationship poses a significant threat to the goods that 
our relationship may bring about. Of course, not all threats to these goods must take the form of 
lethal threats. Indeed, it is rather easy to conceive of cases in which extremely valuable goods are 
                                                                                                                                                       
occasion. 
34 Indeed, some might see this as reason for skepticism concerning the extent of the applicability of 
national partiality. See: Fabre (2012); Lefkowitz (2009); Miller (2005). 
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threatened, but individuals’ lives are not. Certain parts of our cultural heritage—such as 
monuments, art, architecture, or, more broadly, ways of life—have considerable agent-relative 
value for us. Indeed, this value is so significant that we have a special justification for employing 
force in defense of it than individuals for whom these artifacts are not nearly as significant. 
The same point applies to the case of the state as well: Even if the lives of the individuals 
within a state are not threatened, they may nevertheless be permitted to use lethal force in certain 
cases to defend against threats to those goods that emerge from their relationships with one 
another as compatriots, i.e., as members of this particular collective.35 The relevant goods are 
those collective goods we explored in the previous section—namely, state legitimacy, and its 
culture and shared history. These particular goods provide citizens in the state in which they are 
present with a considerable agent-relative permission to defend them, on account of their agent-
relative value to these individuals.36 In other words, to connect this point to our much earlier 
discussion regarding the bloodless invasion objection, individuals may be permitted to use lethal 
                                               
35 It is worth emphasizing here that many cases in which national partiality arises involves the actions of 
individuals acting qua state agents. This is one way of understanding soldiers’ roles, but it extends to 
other agents of the state, such as police, diplomats, elected officials, and others. In these cases, national 
partiality is not best—or at least not completely—understood as individuals preferring their co-nationals; 
rather, it ought to be understood as the state, through its agents, showing partiality toward its members. 
This also has important implications for how we should understand combatant responsibility. Some have 
argued that there are limits to how agents of the state, like soldiers, bear responsibility for the acts that are 
part of their official duty. On one view, made most famous by Walzer (1977), soldiers who act in 
accordance with the jus in bello criteria act justly, regardless of the justice of their state’s cause. Others 
have argued against this thesis, most notably McMahan (2009b). See also Stilz (2011) and May (2005). 
Thank you to a reviewer for prompting me to address these points. 
36 It is worth noting here another way in which Rodin’s more recent view (2014) is mistaken. The agent-
relative value of the collective goods of a state—that is, the common life, in Rodin’s terms—are different 
from such goods for companies, even those with important values. This is partly because the agent-
relative value—or the most significant part of it, at any rate—of such companies for most employees is 
almost entirely instrumental and substitutable. To see this, witness the ease at which most people take up 
work elsewhere for even the most marginal gains in pay or benefits. This suggests that people see their 
role in collectives that present those values as important, but easily commensurable with other values 
elsewhere. Now, this may be true for some members of some states, and the mere fact that people believe 
this does not suffice to make it true, but I hope the general point here will suffice to reveal some 
difference between the two collectives. 
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force to defend the collective goods of their states against acts of political aggression, even if no 
civilians’ lives are in danger.37 
Let us now return to our earlier discussion regarding the problems that Rodin identified 
for any non-reductivist account of national defense. Recall that on his view, non-reductivist 
accounts cannot explain either why we are permitted to prefer our own state non-instrumentally, 
or why such goods are valuable only subjectively rather than objectively. As I argued then, these 
problems are not inherent to all versions of non-reductive-individualist; by making certain 
alterations to the basic account, we can overcome these problems. And in my view, this is what 
my account of national partiality does. That is, by supplementing a non-reductive-individualist 
account of national defense with the account of national partiality just described, we overcome 
Rodin’s objections and provide a coherent and plausible account of robust national defense. Let 
me now explain why. 
First, such an account explains why we are sometimes permitted to prefer our own state. 
The collective goods that emerge within a particular state generate agent-relative values, which 
in turn ground agent-relative permissions. Thus, I am permitted to prefer the collective goods of 
my state, as opposed to some other, in the same way that I can prefer the goods that emerge 
within my marital relationship, as opposed to some other. Second, as we saw, though agent-
relative values do not provide every individual with a reason to act on them, it does not follow 
therefore that they are merely subjective. Indeed, it is conceptually possible for agent-relative 
values and permissions to be endorsed objectively. If I am permitted to exercise partiality 
towards my spouse in some scenario, then, mutatis mutandis, so are you. And this is because the 
                                               
37 This claim makes no reference to the culpability of the aggressor. It is difficult to imagine a case of 
political aggression in which the aggressor is innocent; at most, the aggressor would be in possession of 
some form of partial excuse. (To my mind, acting on false yet reasonable intelligence would qualify as 
wrong but excused.) At any rate, no matter the case, I am inclined to believe that the citizens are 
nevertheless permitted to use lethal force to defend these collective goods. 
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agent-relative value of my spouse to me is but one instantiation of the more general value of 
one’s own spouse to oneself—a value that everyone can recognize and endorse.  
To be sure, not all proposed agent-relative values are suitable candidates for this 
objective endorsement. But, as we saw, whether they are is a question to be answered from an 
objective rather than subjective standpoint. Throughout my arguments, I have referenced what I 
take to be intuitively plausible cases of such goods within the realm of interpersonal morality—
e.g., the goods that arise between spouses—and I have attempted to provide some reasons for 
endorsing the value of the goods that arise within certain collectives—e.g., the state. But the 
reasons I offered were always of a general sort, one that privileges no particular community or 
relationship over any other. That is, my arguments have focused on the objective foundation of 
this sort of agent-relative permission.  
This point is particularly important in addressing another of Rodin’s worries, namely, that 
systematically unjust states will be permitted to use lethal force in their defense, despite our 
strong intuitions that they not be so permitted. On my view, it seems most plausible to deny that 
the collective goods that such states produce—if indeed there are any at all—are of significant 
enough value to generate agent-relative permissions to use lethal force in national defense.38 In 
particular, if a state systematically fails to respect human rights, or doesn’t possess a monopoly 
on the use of force, then it seems plausible to say that it fails to generate many of the relevant 
sorts of collective goods (in particular, legitimacy and self-determination seem lacking here). In 
other words, when certain conditions obtain, outside forces may be justified in intervening in 
such systematically unjust states. Of course, much will depend on the circumstances of the case; 
even systematically unjust states will likely still produce some collective goods, such as a shared 
                                               
38 But it doesn’t follow from this that such states forgo their right to self-defense altogether. Perhaps they 
still possess agent-relative permissions to defend themselves in particular cases, such as attacks from even 
more systematically unjust states, or those that would make them even worse off than they already are. 
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culture; and if an outside intervention threatens them, the state may still have an agent-relative 
permission to defend them, though perhaps the proportionality constraints will place 
considerable limits on what level of force can be used. There are, of course, many complicated 
issues here that deserve greater attention; however, I shall bracket them for now. The core idea 
here is simply that my account does not presuppose a wholly subjective picture of agent-relative 
values, and thus, can overcome Rodin’s objection. 
If these arguments are correct, then a non-reductive-individualist account, supplemented 
with a plausible form of national partiality, can overcome Rodin’s challenge. Moreover, it 
provides us with a plausible response to the question that was the primary motivation of this 
discussion—namely, whether national defense is permissible in the case of bloodless invasion. 
According to the account just sketched, a state may be permitted to use lethal force (when 
necessary) to defend against a threat to its political self-determination because this is a (non-
reducible) collective good of considerable agent-relative value.  
6. Conclusion 
Those wishing to offer a justification for national defense are faced with a choice. The first 
option is to endorse the reductivist-individualist approach and attempt to accommodate a robust 
national defense—though, as I have shown, this will require tending to the problems I have 
discussed. Another option is to defend an alternative approach that improves upon the problems 
of the reductivist-individualist approach. My version of this view embraces the reductivist claim 
that the ethics of war can be entirely understood by applying the principles of morality. That is, 
we do not need to claim that war is sui generis in order to defend a robust version of national 
defense. Rather, this view rejects the individualism that often accompanies reductivism. The 
value of the goods under threat in cases of national defense is cannot be entirely reduced to the 
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value of the individuals of that nation.39  
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